The Army increasingly recognizes the importance of the social systems in the conduct of operations abroad. However, the current standard Army frameworks and practices make no attempt to understand the social power dimensions of the human domain. This report provides an annotated bibliography of a subset of sources identified in the process of reviewing literature for the Vulnerability Assessment Software Toolkit (VAST) project. This literature review identifies articles written by current or former members of the military who constructively critiqued or otherwise offered suggestions intended to improve the Army's human domain assessment process.
The Commander of ERDC was COL Bryan S. Green, and the Director was Dr. David Pittman.
Introduction

Background
The Army increasingly recognizes the importance of the social systems in the conduct of operations abroad. However, the current standard Army frameworks and practices (DIME-FIL, PMESII-PT, METT-TC, SWEAT-MSO, and ASCOPE) 1 make no attempt to understand the social power 2 dimensions of the human domain. The following seminal citations highlight the importance of this ill-defined research area:
Recent and ongoing conflicts reinforce the need to balance the technological focus of Army modernization with a recognition of the limits of technology and an emphasis on the human, cultural, and political continuities of armed conflict. Nations and organizations in the future will fight for the same reasons that the Greek historian Thucydides identified 2,500 years ago: fear, honor, and interest. 525-3-1, 31 October 2014, p 8-9) .
TRADOC Pamphlet
[Thucydides reference taken from: "Thucydides" in The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War]
The Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO) refocuses the future Joint Force on a critical and ephemeral element of warfare -understanding relevant actors' motivations and the underpinnings of their will. By focusing on the human aspects of military operations, the concept recognizes that war is fundamentally and primarily a human endeavor.
GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JC-HAMO, 25 January 2016
Additionally, as MAJ GEN Robert B. Brown and MAJ Ronald W. Spring note, "The Human Domain cannot be controlled or managed by technical means or capabilities; it requires human contact -person to person interaction -with duration and persistence over time." 3 Despite past efforts, the Army remains unable to adequately define and understand social systems. Although the Army has more than 15 years of lessons learned from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, writers of its doctrine still struggle with how best to address problems related to social systems. The Army's previous efforts have been constrained by its long tradition of developing inventory-based tools, an approach that does little more than list concerns. This traditional approach, however, does not help soldiers make sense of the information they have so carefully compiled.
Further complicating the Army's understanding of social systems is its historical predilection for relying primarily on western-oriented, First World cognitive psychologists, political scientists, and economists to explain complex sociocultural dynamics within the Third World. In their attempts to understand social systems and convey that understanding convincingly to the Army, scholars in these fields have often relied upon measures that can be quantified and ingested into computational models. Unfortunately, these models fall short of being able to characterize the underpinnings of human behavior in a global context. Social scientists from other humanities disciplines, employing qualitative methods and theoretical paradigms associated with their particular field of inquiry, are what the Army needs to better explain social systems.
Moreover, political-military intelligence analysis focuses on relations between nation-states and the functioning of their institutions and key leaders in their political systems. Military interventions have repercussions in the international political arena. However, military operations occur at the local level and have impacts on local politics. Currently, the Army lacks the methods and tools to understand local politics, which take into account the nature of the relationship between government and the governed as well as the structural foundations for the differential exercise of social power.
Objective
This annotated bibliography was prepared in support of the Vulnerability Assessment Software Toolkit (VAST) research effort. As social scientists who have not served within the intelligence or civil affairs career fields, the VAST team nonetheless could look at the Army's doctrine and methods for assessing the human domain and perceive it was insufficient to the task.
Scope
To validate its initial impressions, the research team collected critiques of existing doctrine and methods made by members of the military with experience in applying the doctrine and methods. This annotated bibliography contains some of the most recent, relevant, and direct critiques the team found. It is not nor was it intended to be exhaustive.
While this review primarily concentrates on Civil Affairs (CA), the sources reviewed in Chapter 2 are rarely focused solely on CA. Many of these articles are focused on the ways in which knowledge of local culture can aid an understanding of the operational environment. Focusing on "culture" and "human terrain" was supposed to help the U.S. find its way through the morass of Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these articles were written as the result of frustrating engagements in those two countries and within the counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm that was prevalent at the time.
The observations and insights of the articles that follow, despite their origins in the particular problems of Iraq or Afghanistan or within the struggle to execute a successful COIN campaign, nonetheless help map the places where the U.S. military either fell short, and/or continues to fall short in the ways and methods used to understand the operational environment of foreign cultures. There has been increasing recognition that the military must arrive at a holistic understanding of the problem, and that the present PMESII-PT x ASCOPE construct is insufficient to the task.
The struggles by members of the military to understand what has not worked and to make recommendations for improvement determine where the gaps are and how social science might reduce these gaps while simultaneously improving the Army's holistic understanding of the operational environment. The articles in this annotated bibliography may appear to veer wildly off topic; however, they are all some way relevant to the task of mapping how past attempts to understand foreign contexts have evolved. The problem is not yet solved. The solution to the problem has been the "work in progress" reflected in the articles identified and discussed herein. There remains ongoing tension between CA and intelligence data collections and analyses, and the question of how to successfully integrate those two distinct data streams and analysis efforts. This article introduces the need for Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIR) within the context of COIN in Afghanistan. In the following excerpt, the authors define and discuss the HNIR concept (p 3-4).
What are HNIRs?
What are they? HNIR represent a commander driven cultural change within the ISAF Joint Command. They are more than just questions─ they are tailored and the "right questions" to drive effective population based COIN. HNIR enable the commander to make informed decisionsallow him to more effectively conduct the full spectrum of military and civilian activities that will achieve popular support for government. Information at local levels is systematically collected by organizations across the command, fused, and analyzed to produce knowledge and understanding.
Host Nation Information Requirements is information the commander needs about friendly nation institutions or organizations in order to partner effectively, develop plans, make decisions, and to integrate with civilian activities. Depending on the circumstances, information may include the status of provincial, district or local governance, economic development, infrastructure, or security forces. Other examples include:
• Popular Support -Sympathizers and Active Supporters The scope of HNIR is designed to be comprehensive. These information requirements are far broader than "intelligence", rely on functional experts and integrated processing, and every organization is a potential contributor and "sensor" in the field. The challenge is to harness the staff expertise and information flow to inform the commander and staff so that the context, subtleties and biases inherently important in a counterinsurgency are surfaced and understood.
The intelligence function is an important component in answering the HNIR but the preponderance of information will come from unclassified contributors. The information is available in a variety of reporting processes or can be readily obtained by overt means, and often from nonmilitary sources. Whereas intelligence is usually related to data and specific information an enemy is deliberately trying to conceal or keep secret, the information on the friendly nation characteristics and local circumstances are visible and collectable in the normal course of operations and trust based interaction among partners in a COIN environment. Certainly, there is a place for intelligence collection to provide certain details and discern the existence of deception or bias within the HNIR, but the vast majority of the information is openly exchanged.
Specific examples of HNIR may include:
• What influences are inhibiting the extension of governance in district X? (Governance)
• Who are the key influencers and community leaders that will determine the right projects for economic development? (Development)
• What partnership activities should we take to ensure sustainable freedom of movement for the population? (Security)
• What resources are required to facilitate the access to justice for the district Y? (Justice)
• What grievances are present and are inhibiting trust between the local tribal elders and the district administrators? (Governance)
• Where and when can we enhance the growth of government capacity to serve the population? (Governance)
The authors' argument across the entirety of this article seems a bit muddled. For example, they argue that information on the host nation is readily available (unclassified and needs only to be observed, collected, reported, synthesized, and shared); however, they then move on to argue that this information must be better shared across various echelons and domains, rather than stove-piped. Thus, there are two components identified in the paper:
1. Identifying a type of information that had not been given attention to or leveraged. 2. Identifying issues related to the sharing of information (of any kind) across domains.
Problems with the term HNIR
Nowhere do the article's authors address how one makes sense of the information, nor do they seem to break free from the types of information they currently collect; they've just added another "sector" across which to collect it or pay attention to it from a different angle.
There is no theoretical underpinning to determine what HNIR might be, what questions to ask, or what frameworks might guide determination of what is important/most important. The questions they provide in illustration are very specifically task-oriented rather than helping to holistically map various ways and means through which different forms of power flow so that the military could understand the elements in play at both micro (local) and macro (province/region) levels. The general impression is that this paper presents a very vague identification and articulation of a gap, but it proposes a solution that is pretty feeble and random because it is completely dependent upon the education (e.g., social science, political science, anthropology, economics) of the person(s) who happens to be formulating the questions that need answering within the civil society realm. It's a stab at articulating the gap, but not a particularly good one.
Of note is the paper's mention of how military staffs have worked to see the operational environment in a more holistic way, rather than focusing exclusively on the PMESII(-PT) construct . Aside from expanding who on the staffs might be engaged in this analysis (based upon their unique educational background or real-world experience), this paper does not provide a detailed description of how to arrive at this more holistic understanding.
5 Source found by searching the internet for HNIR to see how widely this term/concept was used by the U.S. Army. This article was posted at Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association (AFCEA) website: https://www.afcea.org/content/commands-information-dominance-center-fuels-comprehensive-operations. AFCEA was formed in 1946, and it may be of some interest to the VAST team with regard to consumption of big data.
6 Source found by searching the internet for HNIR to see how widely this term/concept was used by the U.S. Army.
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In the graphic from an outtake of the article (Figure 1 ), one can see that the authors describe the process as "layered." However, it is not clear how and to what extent this "new" way of analyzing the operational environment is different from and better than the old way. The following text represents an excerpt from paragraph 1.2: The paragraphs quoted above from the October 2015 white paper clearly state that Army skill identifiers exist for required civil sector functional specialties. In the past, the Army would recruit civilians who had the requisite skills and experience in these functional specialties to serve in Reserve CA units. The Army has been unsuccessful in recruiting enough civilians who have the desired knowledge, skills, and experience to meet CA needs.
The VAST team will want to discover which skills the Army has identified as needed to fill out the CA reserve ranks when recruiting among civilians. This article, written by an assistant professor of American politics, policy, and strategy at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), argues that the Army needs to start formally educating and fielding Politics-and-Policy staff officers for each deploying basic combat team (BCT). The politics-and-policy staff officer, unlike the tactical S2 staff whose focus is by needs on the enemy, would focus on matters pertaining to host-nation governance and security forces.
According to Scher (p. 37), the politics-and-policy officer would be an additional skill qualifier for the officer's current functional area:
The politics-and-policy officer need not be its own functional area that forces an officer out of the operations track and command pipeline like the strategist, acquisition, or foreign-area officer specialties. Rather, it could be an additional skill identifier consisting of formal schooling and a utilization tour. Selection must be competitive and nominative, and Note that the VAST team will likely recommend an interdisciplinary course of instruction in the social sciences as the best training for the needed skill set, so the idea of sending anyone off to an existing civilian graduate school program wouldn't work. Despite MGEN Flynn's diminished reputation, this paper made a lot of sense when it was first published and read by this paper's authors. Obviously, COL Cahill also thinks there's some validity to the arguments contained in it, because he provided it for the VAST team's consideration and review. After reviewing a PowerPoint briefing that COL Cahill provided, which laid out how a Stability Operations Information Cell (SOIC) was assembled and designed to function, it's pretty clear that the Army was tasked with figuring out how to operationalize MGEN Flynn's ideas for Afghanistan, even before this 2010 paper was published. It is also clear that CIDNE was just an electronic clipboard for collecting and sharing standard ASCOPE/PMESII-PT information with as many units as possible (i.e., U.S. and other friendly).
At its most basic, the argument presented herein suggests that the U.S. military's intelligence efforts in Afghanistan were focused predominantly on the enemy (the problem), when efforts should have been equally focused on knowing and understanding the civilian population in Afghanistan (the likely solution). We've been the hammer looking for the nail to pound in, rather than turning the hammer around and using the claw to pull the offending nail out. The paper acknowledges that tactical and strategic concerns overlap in the intelligence realm as well as on the battlefield. The authors argue for the need to collect and analyze populationcentric information, including issues related to governance, development, and local populations (politics). They claim their overall approach would "have not only immediate, practical value, but also the potential to catalyze a more powerful, relevant, and holistic intelligence system" (p. 12). Of note to the VAST team is the vignette in "Fixing Intel" that illustrates how digging a well for one tribe might cause trouble with another due to depleting the aquifer in one area in favor of another. "This is a problem well-known to water engineers the world over, but not necessarily to every executive agency or military commander operating in Afghanistan" (p. 20). This comparison nicely illustrates how power flows; it's not always through "key leaders."
The comparison leads one to realize that everything is an ecosystem, and military leaders must be aware that whatever pebble is cast into particular waters will create ripples far beyond the point at which it dropped. Because military forces focus mainly on kinetic ops (i.e., kill 'em all and let God sort them out), its leaders are less inclined to seek out the more subtle power flows.
However, this paper provides a direct link between recent military goals and those of the development community. In reading this report again, even 7 years after it was first published, the arguments still make sense and the critique seems both logical and fair.
It should be noted that the term "Host Nation Information Requirements" makes an appearance in this 2010 document (p. 21). Speaking to the issue of the relationship between intelligence and CA is the following excerpt (p.
22):
Some intelligence officers contend that "white" topics are not Intel's job but the responsibility of civil affairs and stability staffers -the CJ9. However, CJ9 lacks the analysts, training, and resources to systematically gather, process, and disseminate relevant "white" information. 11
Naturally, intelligence personnel seek to align themselves with the POINTY (manly) end of the spear. Things that are equally important to winning, but are seen as "less manly"-civil affairs and stability work (such as that done by nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], State Department)-in the minds of the Intel community, are consigned to those not directly supporting the tip of the spear.
The authors conclude with the following words (p. 23):
….the US intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign. However, the authors miss the "analysis" element and the possibility that social science might aid in understanding. The authors of this article argue that because "failing to understand the human dimension of conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and political will for the Nation to bear" (p. 13), the Department of Defense Intelligence community must develop a "population-centric social radar" capable of "detect[ing] the precursors to political change, a "social radar" with a level of granularity, understanding, and confidence that enables policy leaders to make informed decisions that maximize national influence left of bang" (p. 14). They argue that once "tensions turn violent…options decrease markedly, the policy costs rise rapidly, and information becomes scarce and expensive" (p. [13] [14] . Throughout the article, the authors argue against retrenchment in the face of budget constraints, advocating (p. 21) that:
The Intelligence Community must develop and mature innovative capabilities that address the challenges of this new threat environment to provide nonlinear, holistic intelligence to decisionmakers and advance its analytic tradecraft. The social sciences, international marketing companies, polling firms, and others possess the data, knowledge, and expertise on foreign populations that the Intelligence Community lacks. By harnessing these assets more effectively and leveraging the capabilities of allies, the IC can in a relatively short period come to understand the key sociocultural constructs of relevant populations. By delving into critical questions, pathways, and indicators for those major and minor countries relevant to U.S. national security, the Intelligence Community can advance its own analytic transformation, deliver more powerful insights to customers, and better avoid strategic surprise. This will enable more effective diplomacy and better focused military activity to keep many budding conflicts left of bang or to more adeptly navigate the reconstitution of societies torn by conflict or natural disaster. In light of the Army's embrace of the concept of the human domain and operations therein, and its reinvigorated recognition of warfare as a fundamentally human activity, Herbert advocates for the study of warfare from the social science perspective. He believes the underlying factors of warfare would be better explained by "intellectual constructs relying upon cultural anthropology, psychology, and sociology" than history (p. 83). He asserts the following (p. 83):
We must break away from the familiar think tanks and perfunctory advice from complacent experts regurgitating thread-worn theories and statistics. Instead, we must bring new fields of knowledge and information that draw upon diverse experiences and data sets. In short, if the Army is truly serious about understanding human interaction and its relationship with warfare then there has to be a concerted effort to reach out to these other fields of study that specialize in humanness in a more hands-on way.
Herbert recognizes the problem with this idea is twofold. The Department of Defense does not have a particularly good relationship with social scientists as a whole, and it has rarely engaged social science to aid in understanding warfare. He notes that where the military has engaged social science it has most often been "horribly misused" (p. 84). He advocates for the Department of Defense (DoD) to bridge the existing gap between itself and the social science community. He concedes the military must reach out to academia and begin to build bridges. His long-term goal for this collaboration is to foresee and prevent conflict. Herbert thus notes the following (p. 87):
Incorporating the study of the social sciences into the concept of the human domain will lead to profound change in the way the Army deals with conflict through a deeper synthesis of knowledge about ourselves and our social behavior. Conversely, academia could greatly benefit in its study of the sociological dimensions of human violence by professional association with those who conduct war first hand and have an intimate familiarity with it.
This article supports the VAST team's contention that social science-in particular cultural anthropology and sociology-can make significant contributions to military assessment and to understanding the human domain.
Source: Matthew J. Schmidt, "A Science The publication in which this chapter appears is a compendium of papers exploring the various issues related to strategic thinking in the U.S. Army. Chapter 12 is written by Dr. Matthew J Schmidt and addresses the predominance of quantitative-over-qualitative approaches to understanding within the Army. Schmidt argues that quantitative methods are appropriate for tactical engagements and can inform strategic thinking. However, he argues that a qualitative approach is more appropriate when trying to answer questions with strategic implications.
In the author's own words, Schmidt argues the following (p. 220):
…military culture continues to conflate strategic thought with a flawed, quantitative/predictive model of the social sciences. The result is that when this inherently impossible predictive standard fails to be met, rather than question the basis of the model, strategic thinking that is self- Moreover, the author concludes (p. 222):
The modern American military tradition is techno-scientific to the extreme. In practice this means that the American tradition is chiefly defined by its "systemic application of science and technology," as a way to gain "complete predictability and centralized control over armed conflict . . . ." (Bousquet, 2009, p. 33 )…. The implication of this institutional commitment to the predictability model of the hard sciences is that it naturally privileges the quantitative way of knowing.
Despite the Army's cultural preference for quantitative approaches to problem solving, Schmidt argues convincingly that the work of military strategists is more appropriately addressed through qualitative methods. In other words, war is a messy human endeavor not easily understood or solved by quantitative analytical methods more appropriately applied to the realm of hard sciences. The author notes the following (p. 223):
Unlike in physics where what was true about a feather dropped from the Tower of Pisa some half a millennia ago remains true today, in the world of social behavior what was true just yesterday is often not true today.
Even in economics, the supposedly "hardest" of the "soft" sciences the inside joke is that economists are, "experts who will know tomorrow why the things they predicted yesterday did not happen today" (Flyvbjerg, 2005, p. 39) .
CA (and intelligence) assessments are the mechanisms through which the Army understands the operational environment, including its civilian inhabitants. Unfortunately, the PMESII-PT x ASCOPE assessment methodology prescribed by doctrine suffers from the same problems that Schmidt identifies. The VAST team can mobilize the argument Schmidt makes about the usefulness of qualitative data in the strategic realm to make the case that PMESII-PT x ASCOPE is insufficient to arriving at an understanding of human behavior. Thus, the U.S. Army and its CA operations would benefit from strengthening their assessment process by incorporating both social science theory and methodology into the existing process. Hildebrand opens by reminding the reader that, at its core, war is a human endeavor. After a quick review of existing tools for mission analysis that are employed at various echelons within the Army, the author notes that the existence of so many tools and mnemonic devices is a testament to the complexity of the operational environment (e.g., DIMEFIL, PMESII-PT, METT-TC, SWEAT-MSO, ASCOPE, and AOKOC [Avenues of approach, Observation and fields of fire, Key terrain, Obstacles and movement, Cover and concealment]) employed at various echelons within the Army, the author notes that the existence of so many tools and mnemonic devises is testament to the complexity of the operational environment. He then argues that the human domain, being as complex as the operational environment, deserves "the same thoughtfulness, introspection, and analysis in order to understand it" (p. 90). He proposes using social factors to analyze and describe the human domain aspects of the operational environment. Specifically, he proposes using the following social factors: moral, religious-spiritual, social, political, economic, and aesthetical, which result in the somewhat unfortunate mnemonic, MRsSPEA).
He defines/describes each of the factors thusly (p. 93):
• Moral -Describes the sense of commitment, respect for others, value of dignity, and general concern for all living things.
• Religious-spiritual -Describes the value of the afterlife, reverence of the transcendental, need for spirituality, deference for truth, and sense of reciprocity.
• Social -Describes the relevance of community, the appreciation of good human relations, the value of hospitality, the high regard for family, and respect for authority and elders.
• Political -Includes a sense of equality, an appreciation for the balance between collectivism and individualism, and esteem for governance.
• Economic -Encompasses the value of free enterprise, economic security, fair distribution and equity, desire for wealth and growth, and regard of efficiency of work.
• Aesthetical -Explores the relevance of art in society: art as an expression of beauty, art as a tool for communicating, and art as a vestige of history.
Hildebrand notes that while these social factors have not yet been codified as an analytical framework within doctrine, "the Army has been working with these social factors under different auspices and through a variety of means" (p. 91). These means include but perhaps are not limited to country briefs, cultural studies, and comprehensive language classes. Without an actual framework that can be applied in a systematic and structured way, the commander may not fully appreciate nor fully understand information as it is currently being presented.
Hildebrand provides the reader with an example of how the Army might apply such a framework and concludes by arguing that MRsSPEA, as a subset of PMESII-PT, would facilitate mission command.
A trained sociologist likely will not think that the social factors, as Hildebrand has identified and defined them, would significantly enhance the Army's understanding or the human domain. Nonetheless, it should be noted that he recognizes something significant is missing from the current assessment process. Building on an article by Tom Pike and Eddie Brown published in March 2016 on the Small Wars Journal website, 12 which introduced the concept of Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) by using IPB as a nucleus and integrating concepts from complex adaptive systems theory, Morris suggests there is a more holistic way to understand the operational environment, specifically (p. 59):
Instead of primarily identifying and evaluating the enemy or the threat, the complex IPB process helps intelligence staffs analyze multiple groups and how they interact and collectively behave. Like the hybrid and dynamic threats it was developed to defeat, complex IPB combines conventional and innovative approaches that emphasize cultural and population factors, perception assessments, and analysis of nonmilitary actors in order to create a more accurate understanding of the OE. Therefore, complex IPB expands the core process to include sociocultural profiling, link and social network analysis, and computational agent-based models.
This article is illuminating because clearly its author, as well as authors Pike and Brown (on whose article Morris builds), sense there is something missing in the present approach to understanding the operational environment. The instinct of all three authors is to turn to linear thinking, quantitative analysis, systems thinking, and agent-based modeling to help describe and explain the human domain of the operational environment.
These are the very techniques, however, that the two Schmidt articles criticized for being inadequate to the task of understanding the context of the operational environment (see preceding reviews). The Morris article is helpful to the VAST team's efforts because it serves as the perfect example that confirms many, if not most, of the arguments made by Schmidt. It further illustrates that knowledgeable military personnel think the present means of assessment is inadequate.
The remainder of Morris's article is devoted to using the situation in Ukraine to illustrate the explanatory power of the approach that the author and a few of his sources advocate. It could be argued that Complex IPB is not the solution to the identified problem, but at least this article makes an attempt to provide a solution, however inadequate to the task. Therefore, any form of inquiry designed to understand such an environment must address such aspects to convey meaning.
The author advocates incorporating identity theory and the proper use of the narrative as a more abstract means to fill the gap between PMESII-PT and other more holistic approaches. His solution is built on a foundation of systems thinking/systems analysis. More specifically, Ducote writes the following (p. iii):
Rather than using a linear and predefined list of variables, like PMESII-PT, users of the more abstract approach will apply a more generic form of
